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After the rapid rise and fall of Sunni Islamist political actors following the 
Arab uprisings that began earlier this decade, a strong fragmentation has 
emerged within this political spectrum. The division exists within Islamist 
political groups in their national contexts as well as between them across 
different countries. The Tunisian Ennahdha, the Egyptian Muslim Brother-
hood, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood stand as respective models for 
Islamists in power, under repression, and in civil wars.
 • The Tunisian Ennahdha falls into the category of “Islamists in power.” It acts 
within the political system, understands itself as a national political party, and 
has separated politics from religion. However, the party is in danger of losing 
its appeal. The Tunisian Islamist constituency is increasingly turning to jihadist 
Salafist actors.
 • The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood falls into the category of “Islamists under 
suppression.” It suffers from serious repression by the Sisi government, which 
has led to a massive structural and ideological fragmentation of the organi-
sation. Although the old guard still adheres to the principle of non-violence, 
younger activists are increasingly open to using violent means and clear shifts 
towards radicalisation have occurred. This may have spillover effects on the 
Islamist political spectrum beyond Egyptian borders.
 • The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood falls into the category of “Islamists in civil 
wars.” It has been operating from exile since 1982 and has not managed to turn 
itself into a major political player once again, even since the uprising against the 
Assad regime started in 2011. The organisation is facing a generational battle 
and is in danger of losing adherents to radical actors such as jihadist Salafists.
Policy Implications
European policymakers should strengthen moderate Islamist branches by sug-
gesting to partner countries in the MENA region and the United States that in-
creasing pressure on these actors will most probably lead to their radicalisation. 
Moreover, they should not push moderate Islamists too far towards moderation 
and a departure from Islamic values, because this might increase the divide be-
tween the Islamists and their constituencies. 
   2    GIGA FOCUS | MIDDLE EAST | NO. 7 | NOVEMBER 2017 
Taking Stock: Sunni Islamist Political Actors after the Arab  
Uprisings
Sunni Islamist political actors seemed to be the big winners of the Arab upheavals 
(the so-called “Arab Spring”) that have shaken the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) since late 2010/early 2011. They won elections in Tunisia and Egypt and 
were significantly represented in the 2012 General National Congress in Libya. In 
Egypt, Mohamed Morsi was elected president in 2012. He was the first freely elected 
president of the state to come from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). After this rapid 
rise to power, however, Islamist political actors experienced a devastating fall ush-
ered in by the overthrow of Morsi on 3 July 2013. Morsi’s ouster sent shock waves 
through the Sunni Islamist political spectrum in the MENA region, as the Egyptian 
MB even to this day has an important ideological appeal to Islamist political groups 
and their adherents in many countries. Although national Islamist political actors 
outside Egypt are not formally linked to, and are gradually dissociating themselves 
from, the Egyptian branch, Sunni Islamists who are in some way linked to the MB 
still consider the Egyptian MB, founded in 1928, as the ideological mother organisa-
tion of all Sunni Islamist organisations in the MENA region and the Gulf.
Irrespective of the decline of the MB since 2013, neither the political ideology 
of Islamism nor Islamist political actors have fallen into oblivion. In fact, Islamism 
remains the dominant political ideology in the MENA region. Nevertheless, it looks 
different today than it did before the Arab uprisings and the subsequent electoral 
successes of Islamist organisations. Since 2013 we have witnessed the emergence 
of a considerable fragmentation within the Sunni Islamist political spectrum along 
ideological and organisational lines that did not previously exist to this extent. This 
fragmentation manifests in two ways: within Islamist political groups in their re-
spective countries, and between Islamist organisations across different countries. 
Within the Islamist organisations, the division largely appears between the older 
and the younger generation; the latter has been strongly shaped by the Arab up-
heavals. The fragmentation between Islamist political actors across different coun-
tries has occurred because the contexts in which they are engaged have significantly 
diverged since 2011. This is why Islamist organisations have experienced very di-
verse challenges, to which they have responded in different ways. Today, some of 
them are engaged in national political systems, others are facing heavy suppression. 
Still others have been pulled deeper and deeper into violent conflicts. What Sun-
ni Islamist actors of all three types have in common is the obvious fragmentation 
along ideological and organisational lines. In the following, the Tunisian Ennahdha 
stands as a model for Islamists in power, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for Is-
lamists under suppression, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood for those engaged 
in civil wars.
Islamists in Power: The Tunisian Ennahdha between Pragmatic 
Politics and the Revolutionary Islamist Constituency
The Tunisian Ennahdha, which ideologically originates from the Egyptian MB, was 
banned by the Ben Ali regime. Ennahdha’s leaders and members were either forced 
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into exile or imprisoned in Tunisia under Ben Ali. It was only the regime change in 
2011 that allowed the Islamist Ennahdha to enter the political scene and to become 
a legal political party. On 30 January 2011 Rached Ghannouchi, head of Ennahdha 
and co-founder of its predecessor organisation, the Movement of Islamic Tendency, 
returned to Tunisia along with other exiled leaders of the movement. Ennahdha de-
cided to take part in the elections for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) and 
achieved a spectacular victory, winning 41.5 per cent of the seats, more than any 
other party (EU 2011: 13). Although Ennahdha did not have the majority and thus 
entered a coalition with the secular Congress for the Republic (CPR) and the social 
democratic and secular Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties (also known 
as Ettakatol, FDTL), it was the strongest force in the NCA, the body tasked with 
drafting the Constitution. After winning the elections, Ennahdha was observed with 
suspicion by many Tunisians – especially from the secular spectrum. Adherents of 
secular political parties and other segments of the Tunisian population feared that 
Ennahdha would follow a hidden radical Islamist agenda – an accusation to which 
Ennahdha responded in several ways: First, it underscored several times that it 
aimed to establish a civil and democratic state and not an Islamist one. Second, 
during the Constitution-drafting process, Ennahdha was eager to compromise with 
its coalition partners and to take more moderate positions than it had at the be-
ginning of the process. Different from what the Islamist party had first proposed, 
it backed down from its request to include Islamic law, shari'a, into the Consti-
tution. Ennahdha also agreed to depart from conservative stances it had initially 
proposed regarding the role of women and the issue of blasphemy. In moderating 
its positions, Ennahdha not only responded to the fears coming from critics but 
also pursued its interests, trying to ensure that the coalition government made up 
of Ennahdha, CPR, and Ettakatol would not be threatened and that Ennahdha itself 
would not lose its position of power in politics. Third, Ennahdha increasingly disas-
sociated itself from the Egyptian MB, its ideological basis, and more broadly from 
the political ideology of Islamism altogether. Ennahdha politicians such as Sayida 
Ounissi, member of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People – the Tuni-
sian parliament – underlined that the political thought and ideology of the Egyptian 
MB played an important role in the intellectual evolution of Ennahdha but is far less 
important today than many observers assume (Ounissi 2016: 2 et seqq.). When it 
comes to the political ideology of Islamism and to combining religious values and 
democratic principles, Ennahdha leaders do not refer to the MB but rather to par-
ties such as Germany’s Christian Democratic Party (CDU), which they consider a 
role model for Ennahdha. In May 2016 Ennahdha went one step further and clearly 
separated religion from politics, decoupling the political party from the social and 
religious movement. Ghannouchi explained Ennahdha’s new orientation by refer-
ring to the values of democracy and political and religious freedoms as being guar-
anteed by the 2014 Tunisian Constitution. This makes it possible for Ennahdha to 
relinquish the concept of Islamism and understand itself rather as “a party of Mus-
lim democrats” as Ghannouchi claims (Ghannouchi 2016). Abandoning political Is-
lam enables Ennahdha, first, to better counter those critics who accuse the party of 
pursuing a hidden Islamist agenda. Second, Decree Law 88, adopted after Ben Ali’s 
fall in 2011, states that founders and leaders of associations are prohibited from 
holding positions in the main organs of political parties. Thus, there were also legal 
reasons for Ennahdha’s delinking religion and politics. One should, however, not 
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understand the separation of politics and religion in a strict sense. Ennahdha lead-
ers even refuse to use the word “separation” and instead talk of a “specialisation,” 
meaning that, corresponding to Decree Law 88, Ennahdha leaders will no longer 
be able to hold positions simultaneously in politics and in civil society institutions. 
Having leaders specialised in politics and others specialised in preaching within 
civil society allows Ennahdha to mobilise a broader constituency (Marks 2016).
This obviously moderate approach that Ennahdha follows may be appealing to 
Tunisian secularists and Western politicians, but it has contributed to the fragmen-
tation of the Sunni Islamist political spectrum in Tunisia – within Ennahdha and 
beyond. Although removing shari'a from the Constitution led to sharp criticism 
from within Ennahdha’s ranks and even spurred some of the party’s more dogmatic 
leaders to take to the streets, in general its members have supported Ennahdha’s 
focus on politics and its simultaneous official withdrawal from religion. During the 
party’s 10th congress in May 2016, 80.8 per cent of Ennahdha’s delegates supported 
the decision to delink religion from politics. However, Ennahdha faces increasing 
criticism among its adherents and is in danger of losing its support base in the 
Islamist spectrum. Especially members of its conservative youth branch are said 
to have left the party and to have connected with Salafist organisations that are in-
creasingly displaying radical trends in Tunisia. Since the fall of the Ben Ali regime, 
jihadist Salafists have been particularly appealing to the disillusioned youth, whose 
conditions have not much improved since regime change took place, especially in 
rural areas. Ennahdha has contributed to this radicalisation process. By focusing 
more directly on politics and leaving religion behind, Ennahdha has left a hole to be 
filled in Tunisia’s religious sphere, which has traditionally been weak. Under Ben 
Ali, religious institutions were either weakened by or used to support the regime. In 
line with this, after Ben Ali’s fall many Tunisians accused the religious institutions 
of having cooperated with the former regime; thus religious institutions have had 
trouble appealing to the population. By focusing on politics and not filling a spot in 
the religious sphere, Ennahdha left room for radical jihadist organisations and their 
ideologies to step in. At the same time, Ennahdha’s moderate stances – such as 
agreeing to not incorporate shari'a into the Constitution, and failing to completely 
break with the political establishment coming from the Ben Ali regime – have raised 
sharp criticism in the Salafist sphere and contributed to the radicalisation of the 
Islamist political spectrum in Tunisia (Fahmi and Meddeb 2015: 11 et seqq.). 
Islamists under Suppression: The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
and the Shift towards Radicalisation 
After the Egyptian MB had renounced violence following the assassination of Presi-
dent Sadat in 1981, the organisation turned to politics and understood participation 
in politics as the right tool to achieve political change. Morsi’s fall and how the 
Egyptian government has treated and suppressed the MB’s leadership, members, 
and adherents since then have changed the stance of some elements within the MB 
towards the use of violence. This has led to an increasing fragmentation within the 
organisation and its constituency along ideological and organisational lines. 
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In terms of the ideological fragmentation, we can witness a structural divi-
sion between the old guard and youth activists within the Egyptian MB today. The 
old guard – which is mainly represented by figures such as Acting Supreme Guide 
Mahmoud Ezzat; Deputy Head Ibrahim Mounir, based in London; and Secretary-
General Mahmoud Hussein – still adheres to the principle of achieving political 
change by participating in the political system without using violence. By contrast, 
the youth activists have started to understand violence as a legitimate tool to achieve 
political change. At first sight, the split between the old guard and the youth activ-
ists seems to run along only generational lines. However, it is crucial to recognise 
that the ideological orientation towards non-violence (old guard) or violence (youth 
activists) cannot be separated from the context of the two factions’ personal experi-
ences. While members of the old guard – many of whom have experienced prison 
or exile – have been engaged in politics since the MB’s renouncement of violence in 
1981, the young generation has faced brutal repression by the Sisi government since 
Morsi’s decline.
This split also appears in organisational terms. After the Sisi government be-
gan to severely suppress the MB and its adherents in 2013, a leadership vacuum 
emerged within the MB. The organisation’s leadership was either imprisoned with-
in Egypt or exiled to cities such as Doha or Istanbul. At the same time, youth activ-
ists, who were increasingly advocating for a strategy of escalation towards the Sisi 
government and were open to using violence, needed to fill this vacuum from within 
their own ranks. In February 2014, when the MB held internal elections, the youth 
activists managed to realise their demands: the MB restructured itself, since which 
time the youth activists have been far better represented. By structurally integrat-
ing the youth into the MB, the old guard had tried to prevent the young activists 
from turning towards radical jihadist actors such as the Islamic State. In the 2014 
internal elections and the following elections in 2015 for those Muslim Brothers liv-
ing outside Egypt, young leaders were able to start strengthening their power and 
influence, and the division has sharpened between them and the old guard. Moreo-
ver, the internal elections not only empowered youth leaders but also changed the 
structure of the MB from that of a strict hierarchical organisation to a more diversi-
fied one, allowing the respective units to take decisions and political action without 
requiring authorisation from the leadership (Hamdid, McCants, and Dar 2017: 5; 
Hashem 2015). This change has made it more difficult for the MB leadership to 
pursue one coherent line of action. These organisational changes are a clear sign of 
the departure of the MB from its strict hierarchical structure, which had previously 
demanded rigorous obedience from its members vis-à-vis the leadership. This prin-
ciple had characterised the MB since its founding in 1928.
Currently, the old guard is still considered to wield more power than the youth 
activists. The former can rely on a strong network with ties to different countries, as 
many of the senior leaders are based in important world cities such as London, Is-
tanbul, and Doha. This network provides them access to a broader system of finan-
cial resources. However, although the old guard has not budged on its non-violent 
stance, within the MB we can observe a clear shift towards radicalisation. This be-
comes especially clear when following the MB’s discourse on violence. To broadcast 
and propagate their message, youth activists and the old guard mainly use the MB’s 
London-based websites, new social media tools, and the diverse network of media 
channels that have opened in Turkey since the fall of Morsi and that are linked to or 
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support the MB. All of these networks, some more than others, have given radical 
clerics opportunities to broadcast their messages to a wide audience. 
In January 2015, for the first time since 1981 statements were made in the name 
of the MB that legitimated and justified the use of violence, in this case to overthrow 
the Sisi regime. Since then, documents have been released that have legitimised the 
use of violence against the Sisi government without, however, literally mentioning 
violence but rather phrasing it as “defensive jihad,” or “resistance” (Awad 2017). 
They called for people to pursue the revolutionary approach by any means neces-
sary, including violence (Ranko and Nezda 2016: 528 et seqq.). These documents, 
like the booklet The Jurisprudence of Popular Resistance to the Coup, were either 
directly drafted and thus legitimised by Muslim scholars close to the MB, or at least 
grounded in decisions based on shari'a law taken by a larger number of religious 
authorities. They clearly illustrate the shift towards the use of violence, which is 
dangerous for several reasons: First, the MB leadership is increasingly in danger of 
losing control over the youth – exemplified by the contradictory statements on the 
use of violence published in the name of the MB on the organisation’s official web-
site. Second, the discourse of the MB and Salafist actors seems to be ever-merging, 
even showing overlap in ideological terms (Ranko and Nezda 2016: 524 et seqq.). 
At the same time, militant Salafist ideologies are increasingly appealing to elements 
within the MB. Third, although Brotherhood parties in other MENA countries are 
increasingly disassociating themselves from the Egyptian MB, as the mother of all 
Islamist organisations the latter still has an important appeal to Islamist organisa-
tions and their adherents in the region. Thus, the radicalisation trend might have 
spillover effects beyond Egyptian borders.
Islamists in Civil Wars: The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Is Not 
Becoming a Major Political Player
After the Syrian MB was founded in the 1940s, it won three of 130 parliamentary 
seats in the elections of 1947. It was thus part of the Syrian political system, though 
only as a minor political force. Following the Baʿath Party’s rise to power in 1963, 
tensions with the MB emerged. However, although the MB was declared illegal 
in 1964, it remained an important opposition force in Syria during the 1960s and 
1970s. Tensions between the MB and the Baʿath regime further escalated in 1976, 
when the MB started to engage in violent activities using guerrilla tactics against 
the Hafez al-Assad regime, which had pushed itself to power in 1970. As a response 
to the increasing attacks against its regime and to defeat a planned rebellion by the 
MB, in 1982 Hafez al-Assad launched a comprehensive and very brutal military at-
tack on the city of Hama, one of the MB’s strongholds. It is estimated that between 
20,000 and 30,000 people were killed in Hama (Blanga 2017: 52). Most surviving 
MB leaders and members fled to exile – most of them to European countries. The 
MB has never returned to Syria.
When the uprising began against the regime of Bashar al-Assad in 2011, the 
MB thought its moment had arrived. But the Syrian MB has still not managed to 
return from exile, and there is strong fragmentation within the organisation itself 
and throughout the Sunni Islamist spectrum in Syria. While the MB is suffering 
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under a generational battle over allocation of power and its general orientation, 
the overall Islamist field in Syria has diffused into many factions of different sizes, 
ranging from the MB itself to radical jihadist actors, such as Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham 
and the Islamic State (IS). They all claim to speak in the name of Sunni Islam. Thus, 
the MB, being part of the internationally recognised National Coalition for Syrian 
Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian National Coalition), competes with these 
actors for power and legitimacy among the Syrian population. 
Since the beginning of the uprising, the Syrian MB leadership has maintained 
moderate positions. It aims to establish a parliamentary system not controlled by 
any religion. The MB has sought to build alliances with other actors in the Syrian 
National Coalition instead of trying to dominate the Council or to Islamise its agen-
da – something critics have always accused the MB of. Nevertheless, the MB holds 
some influential positions within the opposition body, which can likely be traced 
back to the comparatively good organisational structures of the MB vis-à-vis other 
forces in the Syrian opposition. 
Like the Tunisian Ennahdha and the Egyptian MB, the Syrian branch is suf-
fering under a generational battle (Lefèvre 2015: 5 et seqq.). Youth activists – who 
are, along with most other Syrian Muslim Brothers, largely based in Turkey – are 
seeking more influence within the organisation, which is still largely dominated by 
the older generation. The youth activists are critical of the moderate official dis-
course of the MB and accuse the old guard of investing more in their relationships 
with regional and international actors than in the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad 
regime. As in the case of the Egyptian MB, the youth supports a revolutionary ap-
proach. The MB has still not managed to properly address the youth’s demands and 
is thus in danger of losing its young adherents. This trend has been supported by 
two factors: First, in late 2012 the MB officially started to engage in military activi-
ties within Syria after some of its members supported rebels who were militarily 
engaged within the country. Only 10 months later, MB leaders announced that the 
organisation would reduce its level of support for a platform that brought together 
some militarily active rebel brigades, as the military activities did not have the suc-
cess the MB had hoped for. Some of the members who were engaged in the military 
activities are said to have left the MB and joined the rebel brigades or more radical 
organisations such as IS instead. Second, there are religious authorities based in 
Syria who do not agree with the MB’s moderate and pragmatic stance and follow a 
more radical agenda, which they teach within Syria. This might have a radicalisa-
tion effect on the youth and cause them to turn towards more radical Islamist fac-
tions as well. 
Today, the Syrian MB faces three challenges that are hindering the organisation 
from becoming a major political player in Syria: First, although the MB has some 
influence in the Syrian National Coalition, this does not mean it will have a com-
prehensive impact on Syria’s future. At the time of writing, the Assad regime does 
not appear likely to fall; thus the question of what role the Syrian National Coali-
tion will play in the future of Syria remains open. Second, the MB is in the midst of 
a generational battle and there is a danger that more of its younger members will 
turn to more radical organisations. Third, today it is not the MB but radical jihadist 
organisations that are dominating the Sunni Islamist scene within Syria. The Syrian 
MB remains an exiled political player.
   8    GIGA FOCUS | MIDDLE EAST | NO. 7 | NOVEMBER 2017 
Policy Implications
Before the Arab uprisings that commenced in late 2010/early 2011, Islamist or-
ganisations were part of the political system, as in Jordan and Morocco; officially 
suppressed but able to politically engage as independents, as in Egypt; or banned, 
as in Tunisia and Syria. Today, nearly seven years after the Arab uprisings started, 
the picture has become more complex. First, Islamist political actors across the 
region are divided over the right means to achieve political change and, second, 
they are engaged in very different contexts, ranging from participating in political 
systems to being engaged in countries experiencing civil war. This divide of the 
Islamist political spectrum is posing new and substantial challenges for Western 
policymakers. For the latter, it is much more difficult today than in the era before 
the uprisings to evaluate whether Islamist political actors are complying with non-
negotiable values such as non-violence, human rights, or religious tolerance. As 
in the case of the Egyptian MB, though segments of Islamist organisations may 
still adhere to the principle of non-violence, others in the organisation increasingly 
understand violence as an appropriate tool to achieve political change. Moreover, 
organisational structures are softening, and parts of the organisations have stopped 
adhering to the strict top-down chain of command. This fragmentation and diversi-
fication makes it more difficult for Western policymakers to assess which actors can 
function as dialogue partners for the West and which cannot.
Three strategies, which should be pursued simultaneously, might help Euro-
pean policymakers work against the fragmentation and radicalisation within Sunni 
Islamism. First, European policymakers could engage with partner countries in the 
MENA region and the United States and raise concerns that the heavy suppression 
of the MB and its affiliates will most probably lead to a stronger radicalisation of 
the Sunni Islamist political spectrum, which would be counterproductive for the 
MENA region and for the West. Second, Western policymakers should try to keep 
channels towards moderate branches of Islamist political groups open and discuss 
with them how to fight radicalisation – in general but also within their own organi-
sations. Third, when working together with moderate parties, such as Ennahdha, it 
would be helpful to not push these actors too strongly towards moderate pragmatic 
approaches and ideological departures from Islamic values, as this could contribute 
to a sharper division within the organisations and lead to stronger shifts towards 
radicalisation among elements of their constituencies. This would pose a severe 
threat to the stability of the MENA region and the West. 
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